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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HARRY H. ~fULBACH, 
Plaintiff -Respondent, 
vs. 
W. LYNN HERTIG, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
POINT I. 
Case 9959 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING ON 
THE SUDDEN EMERGENCY DOCTRINE. 
POINT II. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DEFINE 
IN THE INSTRUCTIONS WHAT WAS AN IMMEDIATE 
HAZARD. 
POINT III. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO IN-
STRUCT THE JURY THAT EACH DRIVER HAD A DUTY TO 
KEEP A LOOKOUT AND THAT IT WAS NEGLIGENCE TO 
FAIL TO SEE WHAT WAS PLAIN TO BE SEEN. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DIRECT A VER-
DICT FOR THE DEFENDANT BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE 
SHOWED AS A MATTER OF LAW THE PLAINTIFF WAS 
CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT IN FAILING TO YIELD 
THE RIGHT OF WAY AND IN FAILING TO KEEP A 
PROPER LOOKOUT. 
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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CARE 
This is an action for personal injuries and property 
damage arising out of a roll-over of plaintiff's truck 
without a collision between vehicles. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. 
The lower court denied the defendant's motions for (a) 
a directed verdict in favor of the defendant, (b) a new 
trial, and (c) a judgment in favor of the defendant "No 
Cause of Action" non obstante veredicto. 
R,ELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
(1) The defendant seeks an order from this court 
directing the lower court to enter a judgment in favor 
on the defendant and against the plaintiff notwithstand-
ing the jury verdict. 
(2) Or, if this court does not direct the lower court 
to enter a judgment in favor of the defendant, then an 
order to the lower court granting the defendant a new 
trial on proper instructions. 
BTA'TEl\iEN'T OF MATERIAL FACTS 
The vehicles did not collide . This lawsuit involves 
an accident which occurred on March 15, 1962 (R. 184) 
at a,bout 6:38 P.l\I. (R. 126). The accident happened at 
the X shaped intersection of 'Thirteenth East and the 
Cottonwood Diagonal in Salt Lake County (R. 126). 
The accident, according to l\ir. Muhlbach, took place 
during the daylight when visibility was excellent (R. 
161). Prior to the accident Mr. Muhlbach was driving 
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in a northwP~tPrly direction on the Cottonwood Diagonal 
(It 1-l-7) at an admitted speed of -!0 m.p.h. (R. 1-!8). 
~I r. Hertig was driving north on Thirteenth East 
in a white and light green model Oldsmobile (R. 186). 
lmnwdiah_•ly behind ~I r. Hertig's car was a red convert-
ible driven by James R. Cordell (R. 201 & R. 205). 
\?isibility was unobstructed (Exhibits 6-D, 4-D, 3-D, 2-D 
& Officer lba R. 180). Jed K. ~lcl\Iillan, a color-blind 
gentleman (R. 279), was going southeast on the Cotton-
wood Diagonal and when about ten car lengths northwest 
of the intersection observed Mr. Mulbach's truck ap-
proaching as a ear entered the intersection. Mr. Mc-
~lillan was unable to tell (R. 278) whether the ear enter-
ing from the south stopped at the stop sign. ~Ir. Hertig 
testified he stopped at the stop sign facing south twenty-
five to thirty seconds and that there was no other vehicle 
ahead of hiin going north at the stop sign (R. 219). Mr. 
l\Ic>l\fillan, plaintiff's witness, failed to see any vehicle 
stopped at the stop sign ahead of Mr. Hertig going north 
(R. ~5 & R. 278), hut apparently did see Mr. Cordell 
drive into the intersection (R. 278). 
~Ir. Cordell in the car behind Mr. Hertig testified 
.Mr. Hertig stopped at the stop sign facing north, and 
that he observed him stopped as he approached from the 
south, and that he sat behind l\Ir. Hertig's car for some 
twenty to twenty-five seconds (R. 202), and that there 
were no vehicles ahead of Mr. Hertig going north (R. 
20:2). 
~Ir. ~Iuhlbach, going northwest on the Cottonwood 
Diagonal, placed a phantom vehicle, or at least one not 
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seen by any other witness, ahead of l\[r. Hertig's ear 
(R. 148) entering the intersection .ahead of l\ir. Hertig's 
auto. Mr. Muhlbach said he was not positive of the color 
(R. 161) of the vehicle ahead of Mr. Hertig but believed 
it was an old model vehicle that was brown, green, or 
maybe black (R. 161). On one occasion Mr. Muhlbach 
claimed Mr. Hertig followed this vehicle into the inter-
section (R. 162) and that Mr. Hertig slowed down to 
maybe three miles per hour before entering the inter-
section. Mr. Muhlbach said, when he saw the vehicle 
which he identified as Mr. Hertig's, it was two or three 
hundred feet back from the stop sign (R. 166) to the 
south, and from that time he observed it .and noted the 
driver did not look back over his shoulder to the south-
east (R. 167). Mr. Muhlbach claims that he was watching 
this driver close enough so that if he had looked back 
toward him he would have observed this driver looking 
(R. 167). 
But on cross examination (R. 168) Mr. Muhlbach 
admitted that the car he identified as Mr. Hertig's 
slowed up and stopped with the front of it right even 
with the stop sign facing the intersection (R. 168). The 
question asked Mr. Muhlbach was: 
Q. "Will you say the spot he slowed up there and 
stopped was right even with the stop sign, 
with the front of the car~" 
A. "Approximately right around there, yes." 
Mr. Muhlbach could not identify any vehicle as 
being behind the vehicle he identified as belonging to 
Mr. Hertig (R. 168). 
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\tVith rPg-ard to the speed of the vehicle which Mr. 
Muhlbach identified as :Mr. Hertig's, he could not say 
whether it was going faster or slower than 15 m.p.h. at 
tlw time it turned to go northwest on the Cottonwood 
Diagonal, as he was not observing enough to judge the 
speed (R. 164). 
l\[ r. Ilertig testified (R. 219) he made a complete 
stop with the front of his car even with the stop sign, 
that he looked and saw nothing coming from the south-
east on the Cottonwood Diagonal, and that aftPr two 
cars going toward the southeast passed, he proceeded 
into the intersection (R. 220). 
On exhibition 9-D· (R. 220) Mr. Hertig placed a red 
crayon mark to show where his car was in the inter-
section when he turned to go northwest on the Cotton-
wood Diagonal. Mr. Hertig said at the time he made the 
turn indicated by the red mark in the intersection on 
exhibit 9-D, he was going 15 miles per hour or at the 
most 20 miles per hour at the time he began the turn. 
l\Ir. Cordell, the independent witness in the car be-
hind :Mr. Hertig testified that Mr. Hertig made a com-
plete stop at the stop sign for 20 to 25 seconds and then 
proceeded ahead to make a left turn in a normal manner 
(R. 202) and was going 15 to 20 miles per hour at the 
most when he started the left turn, and that Mr. Hertig's 
car was 1.50 feet west of the intersection when he ob-
served the truck turned over. Mr. Hertig did not see 
plaintiff's truck until :JI r. Cordell told him of the acci-
dent. 
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Exhibit 9-D was prepared by W. Y. Tipton and on 
the scale 1 inch equals 10 feet. 
Sgt. E. M. Pitcher, Utah Highway Patrol, testified 
that it was 12lf2 inches on exhibit 9-D or 125 feet from 
the stop sign where Mr. Hertig stopped the front of his 
car to the place where the turn began. Mr. Hertig's 
turn is shown by the red mark on exhibit 9-D (R. 243 & 
R. 244). Further, Sgt. E. M. Pitcher stated (R. 244), 
assuming that Mr. Hertig stopped at the stop sign and 
then proceeded ahead and that the speed of his car did 
not exceed 20 miles per hour at the time he started the 
turn, it would have taken 8lf2 seconds for Mr. Hertig to 
reach the point in the intersection where he started the 
turn (R. 244). Sgt. E. M. Pitcher stated that at the time 
Mr. Hertig's auto left the stop sign, assuming that Mr. 
Muhlbach's truck was going 40 miles per hour, that the 
truck would have been going 58.8 feet per second and 
that the truck was 499.8 feet from the place where the 
turn was started at the time Mr. Hertig left the stop 
sign (R. 245). Further, Sgt. Pitcher said that if the 
truck of Mr. Muhlbach had been going 50 nriles per hour, 
it would have been 624.75 feet from where the turn was 
started at the time Mr. Hertig left the stop sign. 
Mr. Iba, one of the investigating officers, testified 
that the intersection was dry, hard and fairly level as-
phalt and that he did not observe any sand or gravel in 
the intersection when he arrived to investigate (R. 181). 
Mr. Iba also testified that at the scene of the accident 
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"il/r. Jlnhlbach told him he d,id not obserH' the dangn· 
until he was 30 feet from the car he identified as being 
Mr. Hertig's'' (R. 181). 
The testimony of ~fr. Iba was as follows (R. 181): 
Q. "And Mr. Muhlbach told you that he did not 
observe the danger of this thing until he was 
30 feet from ~1r. Hertig's automible 1" 
A. "That's right, sir." 
Q. "At the time he said he was going 35 or 40 
miles an hour1" 
A. "Yes." 
Officer Iba also stated that at the scene of the 
accident Thlr. nlulhbach did not tell him of any vehicle 
proceeding into the intersection ahead of Thlr. Hertig 
(R. 181). ~fr. ~[uhlbach did not deny his statement 
to Officer Iba. 
Officed :Morgan assisted Officer Iba with the in-
vestigation (R. 126). He made a free hand drawing, 
Exhibit 1-P and measured the roadways. Officer Thlor-
gan shows on Exhibit 1-P that east of the intersection 
the Cottonwood Diagonal was 36' 10" from one edge of 
the pavement to the other. He found that Thirteenth 
East was :25' wide from one pavement edge to an-
other. He also found that the first stress mark left 
from the tires on Mr. Thiulbach's truc:k started 13' 3" east 
of the east edge of the pavement, and it was 140' to 
the rear of l\Ir. Muhlbach's truck to where the stress 
marks started 13' 3" east of the east edge of the pave-
ment of Thirteenth East. 
Officer l\Iorgan said the stress marks indicated that 
~Ir. M uhlbach's truck started to swerve to the north (R. 
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127). Mr. Morgan also stated that for all practical pur~ 
poses the intersection was level (R. 129), both roads were 
in good condition, were straight, and there was no 
obstruction to visibility on the southeast corner (R. 130). 
Officer Morgan's drawing, Exhibit 1-P, was not drawn 
to scale (R. 132). 
On cross-examination Officer Morgan identified ex-
hibits 2-D to 6-D, inclusive, and said at the time of the 
investigation the road was dry, there was no condi-
tion on the roadway which would make braking difficult 
(R. 139'), and the roadways were level and in good con-
dition (R. 139 & R. 140). 
Mr. Muhlbaeh testified that the brakes of his truck 
were good (R. 164) and that as soon as he saw the vehicle 
was in front of him, he reacted to avoid it (R. 165). 
Further, Mr. 1\tiuhlhach stated that in his opinion he had 
better than average reactions when he grabbed the wheel 
and swerved to miss the vehicle in front of him (R. 
165). 
Returning to Sgt. E. M. Pitcher, he testified that 
on the morning of the trial he ran a coefficiency test of 
the friction of the roadway and found the lowest drag 
factor would be .84 on the Cottonwood Diagonal (R,. 284 
& R. 290). Further, Sgt. Pitcher stated (R. 291 & 292), 
assuming that Mr. ~fuhlhach's vehicle was going 40 miles 
per hour on the Cottonwood Diagonal, that the roadway 
was dry, there were no loose 1naterials on it, and that 
the drag-factor was .84, that from his studies and tests 
he round it would be reasonabJe for the truck to stop 
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in 63lj2 feet of braking, and that if you a~~nmed re-
action time of ~4 of one ~econrl, during that period 
at 40 miles per hour the truck would have traveled 44.1 
feet and the total stopping distance for reaction time 
and braking would be 107 feet. 
Sgt. Pitcher also testified (R. 293) that a vehicle 
equipped with brakes having a braking efficiency of .435 
would not have good braXes but that such brakes would 
meet minimun1 standards, and that with such brakes (R. 
294) the total braking distance would be 122.6 feet and 
the total stopping distance with % of one second for 
reaction time at 40 miles per hour would be 166.7 feet 
(R. 294). 
At the request of plaintiff's counsel (R. 46) and 
over defendant's objection (R. 301), the court gave In-
struction No. 16 (R. 94) on the emergency doctrine. 
Instruction No. 16 given was as follows: 
No. 16 
"One who, in a sudden emergency, acts ac-
cording to his best judgment, or who, because of 
lack of time to form a judgment, omits to act in 
the n1ost judicious manner, is not chargeable with 
contributory negligence, provided he exercises in 
the emergency the care of a reasonable prudent 
individual under like circumstances. 
"In such a situation, his duty is to exercise 
only the degree of care which an ordinary prudent 
person would exercise under the same or similar 
circumstances. If, at that moment, he exercises 
such care, he does all the law requires of him, 
even though, in the light of after-events, it might 
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appear that a different choice and manner of ac-
tion would have been better and safer." 
Counsel for Mr. Hertig requested that the court 
give an instruction defining "Immediate Hazard" to the 
jury (R. 65). Defendant's requested Instruction No. 13 
was not given (R. 65) and no place in the charge to the 
jury (R. 78 to R 106) did the court define· jmmediate 
hazard. Requested Instruction No. 13 from the defend-
ant, Mr. Hertig, read as follows (R. 65): 
No. 13 
"The driver of a vehicle entering a highway 
must stop and defer to all vehicles that would be 
required to brake sharply or suddenly to avoid 
a collision. If, however, the vehicle on a through 
highway is far enough away to have a clear mar-
gin to observe and mruke a smooth and safe stop, 
the driver on the through highway is not an im-
mediate hazard, and the driver entering the 
through highway from a stop sign need not yield 
to the driver of a vehicle on a through highway, 
and the driver entering the through highway has 
the right of way." 
Likewise Defendant's requested Instructions No. 14 
and No. 16 were refused. (R. 66 and R. 68) 
No. 14 
"Where the driver of a truck has an1ple time 
to observe a motorist entering the through 
highway and fails to do so in time to avoid an 
accident, the driver of the truck is guilty of con-
tributory negligence." 
No. 16 
"You are instructed that the driver on an 
10 
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arterial highway has the duty to remain reason-
ably alert to the possibility that a driver enter-
ing the arterial highway at an intersection may 
believe that he can enter in safety. 
"The duty to keep a proper lookout applies to 
rarh driver, and neither driver can excuse his 
failure to observe the other driver because the 
other driver failed to observe him. 
''Failure to see what is plain to be seen in 
'negligence'." 
There was no othe-r traffic moving in or about to 
enter this unobstructed intersection. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING ON 
THE SUDDEN EMERGENCY DOCTRINE. 
'The plaintiff, Mr. Muhlbach, did not observe the 
danger of colliding with ~[r. Hertig's automobile until 
he was 30 feet from it, and at a time when he was going 
35 or 40 miles per hour (R. 181). :Mr. ~Iuhlbach never 
did apply his brakes but swerved to the north on seeing 
Mr. Hertig's automobile and left stress marks that 
started 13' 3" east of the east edge of the pavement 
on Thirteenth East. At the scene of the accident 
:\lr. ~[uhlbach admitted to Officer Iba (R. 181) that 
he was going 40 miles per hour or 58.8 feet per second 
at the ti1ne he observed the danger. At that speed 
during ;4, of a second reaction time he had traveled 44.1 
feet. and because of his failure to keep a lookout for 
vehicles reasonably to be expected in the intersection, 
he did not have time to slow or stop his truck, and so he 
11 
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stated he swerved to the north to go north on Thirteenth 
East, but Exhibit 1-P shows that he turned too late and 
turned off Thirteenth East on the west side of the road-
way north of the intersection. 
Mr. Hertig contends that if the emergency or danger 
was created by JJir. 1Jf1thlbach that he can not claim the 
b·enefit of the emergency doctrine, and further ~lr. Her-
tig contends that the instruction given was not a proper 
statement of the law relating to "emergency doctrine" 
and its use or application. 
In Nikoleropoulos vs. Ramsey (1923) 61 Utah 465. 
214 P. 2d 304, where an action was brought for injuries 
sustained by a pedestrian who was overtaken .and struck 
down on a dark rainy night b~~ the defendant driver who 
was driving at a speed of 12 miles per hour when he 
could only see 6 feet ahead, and who admitted that at the 
speed he was driving there was not time to stop after 
he saw the pedestrian who was walking on the edge of 
the blacktop or next to the shoulder of the road, and 
where the court instructed on the "sudden emergency 
doctrine," and plaintiff's counsel objected to the insruc-
tion, and on appeal the objection to the instruction was 
upheld by the court, the court said : 
"We are of the opinion the instruction was 
not applicable to the instant case. The presence 
of a pedestrian on the highway at the point in 
question was reasonably to be anticipated. Beside 
this, we are of the opinion, as a matter of law, 
under facts disclosed by the record that at the 
time of the injury, and immediately before, de-
12 
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fen dan t was not l'XPrcising reasonable care in the 
operation of his car, and if any e1nergency existed, 
it was entirely due to his own negligence." 
Siko/ernpoulos 1·s. Ramse.'J, supra, involvPs the ~mne 
type of situation from which defendant appeals. Because 
of Mr. Muhlbach's speed of 40 miles per hour on the 
Cottonwood Diagonal, he eould not stop when he ob-
served the danger 30 feet ahead of him. 
The instruction given did not caution the jury that 
the emergency 1nust be one which arose without fault on 
the part of Mr. Muhlbach. 'The instruction given on the 
"emergency doctrine" took the question of contributory 
negligence completely out of the lawsuit. 
In Gittens vs. Lundberg (1955) 3 Utah 2d 392, 28-1 
P. :2d 1115, where on appeal the plaintiff complained of 
the trial court's refusal to give a request of the instruc-
tion on ''sudden emergency," the court said there was no 
error co1n1nitted. In Gittens vs. Lundberg, supra, the 
court said the request did not properly state the law be-
cause it did not state the requisite element of the emerg-
necy that is must be one which arose without fault on the 
part of the plaintiff, and said that when the plaintiff 
creates peril by his own fault, he may not thereafter urge 
sudden emergency doctrine to protect hiinself from the 
charge of contributory negligence. 
Instruction No. 16 failed to caution the jury that the 
emergency doctrine did not apply unless the emergency 
arose without fault on the part of the plaintiff. 
In Ferguson vs. Jongsm-4 (1960) 10 Utah 2d 179, 
350 P. 2d -10-1, where a proposed instruction copied from 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Jury Instruction Forms for Utah, No. 17>.-t charged that 
a person who, without negligence on his part is suddenly 
and unexpectedly confronted with .apparent or imrninent 
peril, is not required to use the same prudence or good 
judgment as would otherwise be expected. This court 
said Jury Instruction Forms for lTtah, K o. 15.4 was a 
correct statement of the law as .applied to the facts of 
that case. 
In Howard vs. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., (1954) 2 
Utah 2d 65, 269 P. 2d 295, the court said the emergency 
or sudden or unexpected happening must not he caused 
by fortious conduct by the party claiming the benefit 
of the emergency doctrine. And then on the facts of that 
case reasoned that the emergency was not caused by the 
negligence or tortious conduct of Mr. Byington. 
In Red.d vs. Airway 11! otor Coach Lines (1943) 104 
Utah 9, 137 P. 2d 374, where the evidence showed that the 
decedent rode out onto the highway from the private 
driveway and that the bus driver swerved to his right 
across the curbing to avoid a collision but did not stop 
because the air-brakes were damaged crossing the curb-
ing, the court gave an instruction on the sudden emer-
gency doctrine, and this court said that where the 
emergency or condition was not caused by a party claim-
ing benefit of doctrine and not caused by tortious conduct 
a party that requested instruction it was properly given. 
Instruction No. 15.4 Jury Instruction Forms for 
Utah compares with the B.A.J.I. Instruction Form No. 
137. It would appear Utah Instruction on Sudden Emer-
gency may have been adopted from California. 
14 
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l.n Jones l's, llriurich (19-f~) -!9 C.al. . :\pp. 2d 70~, 
1 ~~ P. :2d 30-f, when the trial judge granted a new trial, 
the Di~tr·id Court of . ..\ ppeals for· the Third District of 
California affirmed an order granting the new trial 
where the emergency instruction was given, and it is this 
dP(·i~ion which appears to have had the foundation for 
B.A.J.I. Instruction No. 137. 
In Jones vs. Heinrich supra, the following instruc-
tion was given: 
"If you find from the evidence in this case 
that the defendant Fred C. Heinrich, was sud-
denly confronted with unexpected and imminent 
danger, either to himself or to another, then he 
was not expected nor required to use the same 
judgment and prudence that would have been re-
quired of him in the exercise of ordinary care in 
calmer and more deliberate moments. His duty 
was to exercise only that ·mnount of care which 
an ordinarily prudent person would exercise if 
confronted with the same unexpected danger 
under the same circumstances.'' 
\Vith regard to the forgoing instruction in Jones vs. 
H eint'ich, supra, the court said: 
"It will be observed that the instruction omits. 
the qualification that the defendant, Heinrich, 
must not have been placed in -a position of un-
expected and im1ninent danger through any fauit 
or negligence on his part. ·Plaintiff requested 
and the court gave an instruction with reference 
to the imminent peril doctrine as applied to the 
decedent which contained the limitation 'Without 
fault or negligence on her part.' Thus, it will 
be seen that the instruction complained of was 
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doubly prejudicial to the plaintiffs as the defend-
ant was given the benefit of the rule, if confronted 
with sudden danger, while plaintiffs were not. 
Appellant contends that other instructions given 
on the question of negligence cure the error, if 
any, in the instruction complained of, citing au-
thorities in support thereof. However, under the 
facts in t!1e instant case, which disclose the main 
issue .to be the question of negligence and con-
tributory negligence, and to which the instruction 
was particularly applicable, the omission of the 
limitation was prejudicially erroneous to the 
plaintiff's case. Gootar vs. Levin, 109 Cal. App. 
703, 293 P. 706; Howard vs. Worthington, 50 Cal. 
App. 556, 195 P. 709; SteAaley vs. Chessum, 123 
Cal. App. 446, 11 P. 2d 428. 
In California in Edgett vs. Fairchild (1957) Cal. App. 
2d 734, 314 P. 2d 973, where plaintiff sought to invoke 
doctrine of sudden emergency or imminent peril at the 
time they were passing an intersection, the court said 
that one invoking the doctrine must have been free from 
negligence placing him in the orbit of peril. 
In New l\Iexico in Otero vs. Phys.icians & Surgeons 
Ambulance Service, Inc. (1959) 65 N.M. 319, 336 P. 2d 
1070, the Supreme Court of New Mexico specifically ap-
proved of an instruction on unexpected peril, where the 
instruction began as our J.I.F.U. Form 15.4 does with 
the phrase, "a person, wlio without negligence on his 
part is suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with a 
peril." In the following case, Jlontoya vs. Winchell 
(1961), 69 N.M. 177, 3-64 P. 2d 104, the New l\1exico Court 
held the trial court could properly refuse a requested 
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instruction on unexpech•d peril where the request failed 
to quali l'y its use and show that it wa~ only a circuln-
stance to be considered to determine if reasonable care 
was exercised. 
ln \Vis<·<m~in in Lentz L's. S orthzveste rn .. Yational 
Cttsl(o/ty Co. (19<H) 11 \Vis. ~d -Hi:Z, 105 X.,V. 2d 759, 
where evidence showed the driver was proceeding along 
the street in the dark during fog and did not see a truck 
which was parked with taillight illuminated until he was 
25 to 30 feet away from it, and thereafter was unable 
to avoid striking it, the court said the driver was negli-
gent as to lookout or speed, or both, and was not entitled 
to the benefit of "sudden emergency" doctrine, and that 
the <'<>Urt committed reversible error in instructing on 
doctrine of sudden emergency, and the court said any 
person \Vhose negligence contributes to, or helps to create 
the emergency is not entitled to the benefit of the rule, 
and the jury in 1nany cases should be so advised. 
lnA11draski vs. Gormley (1958), 3 Wis, ~d 149, 
87 N.S. 818, the court said that where an emergency 
existed because of a driver's failure to keep a proper 
loo~out, he did not come within the emergency rule and 
was not entitled to an instruction on emergency doctrine. 
lnAndraski vs. Gormley, supra, the defendant driver 
failed to see a stalled car and ran into a driver who 
was attempting to change a flat on the highway. 
In ~Iississippi in Pullin lis. Nabors (1961), 240 ~Iiss. 
864, 128 So. 2d 117, in a situation where the defendant 
sa.w the danger or a red light while still a quarter of a 
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mile from the scene of the accident, but did nothing about 
slowing up, an instruction on the "sudden mnergency" 
doctrine was given, and the Supreme Court reversed the 
judgment for the defendant driver, saying the sudden 
emergency was of the driver's own rnaiking in that he 
failed to slow his car or get it under control before arriv-
ing at the scene of the prior accident, and a new trial 
was granted for the plaintiff. 
In Michigan in Garvit vs. Krebs (1953), 338 ~1ich. 
256, 61 N .M. 2d 58, where an action was brought for 
personal injuries received in an intersection collision 
and where an instruction of doctrine of "sudden emer-
gency" failed to state the qualifications on the use of 
that doctrine to the effect that the situation must be one 
not brought about by plaintiff's own negligence, the court 
held the giving of the instruction was prejudicial error 
and granted a reversal and a new trial to the defendant. 
Again in Hicks vs. B & B D,istributors, Inc. (1958), 353 
Mich. 488, 9'1 N. W. 2d 882, where action was brought for 
wrongful death when auto plaintiff was in was struek 
from the rear at stop light and the charge on sudden 
emergency failed to state to the jury that a party is 
entitled to the benefit of the rule only if the emer-
gency occurs through no fault or negligence of his, 
the court said it was error to give the struction and 
granted a reversal. 
In Oregon in Stose vs. Het"nr.ich (1953), 199 Ore. 
386, 261 P. 2d 675, the Oregon Court stated that the in-
struction on "sudden emergency" should show that it 
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would not be effPdive unless the driver who is claiming 
the sudden emergency was confronted with an e1nergency 
through no fault or negligence on his part. 
ln 'fexas in Oru.se vs. DaHiels (1956). Tex. Civ. App. 
293 S.W. 2d 616, where a requested instruction by the 
automobile driver for emergency failed to state that an 
"emergency" was a condition arising suddenly and un-
t>xpectedly and not caused by any negligent act or mnis-
sion by the person in question, the court held the instruc-
tion failed to meet the requirements of the emergency 
doctrine, and that it was not error to reffuse to give the 
instruction. 
In a case from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 
Howard vs. Cincinn.ati Sheet Metal & Roofing Co., (1956) 
7th C.C.A. 234 F. 2d 233, where an action was brought 
for injuries to a passenger in an auto colliding with the 
corporate defendant's automobile driven by defendant's 
employee, an instruction to the jury to the fact that de·-
fendant's O:river had to act suddenly in emergency, with-
out opportunity for deliberation, was a circumstance to 
be considered in determining what was ordinary care 
under the circumstances, was held to be error prejudicial 
to plaintiff where one of the most important questions to 
be resolved by the jury was whether emergency situation 
was created by such driver's acts or by the driver of the 
auto in which the plaintiff was riding. 
A general discussion of the subject of the emergency 
doctrine is found in 80 AL.R. 2d 6. 
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The lower court should not have permitted the 
plaintiff to invoke the doctrine of sudden emergency un-
less the court or the jury found ~1r. ~1uhlbach was free 
from negligence placing him in the orbit of peril. Further, 
it is undisputed that the evidence in this case is to the 
effect that plaintiff's vehicle came into the intersection 
at a speed of 35 or 40 miles per hour (R. 181). As Mr. 
Muhlbach approached the interesection, he had an un-
obstructed view of the stop sign of the intersection that 
Mr. Hertig had to travel in proceeding to go northwest 
on the Cottonwood Diagonal. It is 125 feet from the stop 
sign to weher Mr. Hertig turned to go northwest, and it 
took Mr. Hertig 8lj2 seconds to reach the place where he 
turned, starting at a zero speed and going up to a maxi-
mum of 20 miles an hour. Going from the stop sign to 
the place where the turn was started :Mr. Hertig traveled 
an average speed of 10 miles per hour or 14.7 feet per 
second (R. 244). Sgt. Pitcher divided 14.7 into 125 feet 
and fonud that 8¥2 seconds were involved going from the 
stop that Mr. Hertig made (R. 168) to where the red 
crayon mark was made on Exhibit 9-D. In % of a sec-: 
ond reaction time !1r. Muhlbach's vehicle would have 
traveled 44.1 feet at 40 miles per hour. Since Mr. Muhl-
bach admitted he did not see the danger until he was 30 
feet from it, he surely was in an emergency situation 
and certainly the en1ergency was created for hi1n by his 
own lack of lookout, and undoubtedly under the existing 
circumstances he should not have been permitted to evoke 
the emergency doctrine as stated by the court. 
Mr. M uhlbach stated that he had good brakes and 
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that hP had better than usual rt>ad ion time ( R. U ;~)) 
and that he ~wPrvPd because lw could not slow or 
:-;top. ~gt. Pit<'IH'r tP~tified (R. :2~)1 and R. :2!):2), a:-;-
:-;uming that l\1 r. l\1 uhlbach was going 40 n1iles per hour 
on the Cottonwood Diagonal, that the roadwa~· was dry, 
and there were no loose materials on it, and that the 
drag-factor was .S-!, that from his studies and tests he 
found it would be reasonablle to stop a truck in 63¥2 
ft>t't of braking and -+-+.1 feet of reaction ti1ne or in a 
total stopping distance of 107 feet. However, because of 
hu·k of loakout, 1\Ir. l\Iuhlbach allowed himself only 30 
feet and could not stop or brake safely and control his 
tntck, and he need a total of l 07 feet in which to stop 
with good brakes, but lH', through his own lack of obser-
vations, had allowed only 30 feet. Is is reasonable that 
under these eircumstances he be pennitted to invoke the 
emergency doctrine without it being stated that he i~ not 
entitled to the benefits of the doctrine unless he is with-
out negligence on his part as the doctrine is stated in 
Jury Instructions Utah 15.4t 
l\[r. Hertig contends that the court erred in instruct-
ing on the doctrine of sudden emergency because the 
evidence shows that Mr. Muhlbach did not see the danger 
until he was 30 feet away, and that further the court err-
ed in not stating the doctrine correctly, as a person may 
only invoke it who is without negligence on his part. The 
trial court, on giving Instruction No. 16, committed pre-
judicial error and this court in reviewing the Inatter 
should consider the case in the light Inost favorable for 
lfr. Hertig, the party objecting to the instruction. 
21 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Further, if the plaintiff argues that other testimony 
other than his own was more favorable to him than that 
came from himself on one occasion, the court should keBp 
in mind that the trial court in reviewing a motion for 
a new trial or a motion for a directed verdict or a motion 
for a "Judgment of No Cause of Action" N.O.V. may 
consider such testimony true as hears most strongly 
against the interest of the plaintiff, and that merely be-
cause the plaintiff's own testimony presents a choice of 
probabilities that the plaintiff is not entitled to the most 
favorable probability, and as authority for this proposi-
tion the court's attention is called to the cases of Fou·ler 
vs. Pleaswnt Valley Coal Co. (1898), 16 Utah 348, 52 P. 
594, Alvar;ado vs. Tucker (1954), 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P. 
2 986. It is submitted that one who is not keeping a 
lookout cannot claim a sudden emergency because of lack 
of time. 
POINT II. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DEFINE 
IN THE INSTRUCTIONS WHAT WAS AN IMMEDIATE 
HAZARD. 
No instruction was given by the court defining an 
"immediate hazard," an~ the jury had no guide to tell 
them or tests to use in determining what was or what 
was not an immediate hazard. l\1:r. Hertig requested the 
court to give an instruction defining immediate hazard 
(R. 65) and this request was refused (R~ 65). Defend-
ant's requested Instruction No. 13 set forth in R. 65 was 
ta1ken fromRi:chards vs. Anderson (1959) 9 Ftah 2d 17, 
337 P. 2d 59. In Richa1rds vs. Anderson this court s.aid: 
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"It is clear that the defendant entered the 
intersection considerably ahead of the plaintiff. 
The que~tion then becomes whether plaintiff's 
automobile was so close to the inte-rsection to 
constitute an 'immediate hazard' to defendant 
when thP latter entered the intersection. There is, 
of course, no precise set of measurements by 
which an immediate hazard can be gauged. It 
must be judged on the basis of common sense in 
the light of existing circumstances. In reference 
to a similar situation the Supreme Court of Dela-
ware has said that an 'im1nediate hazard' is 
created when a vehicle approaches an intersection 
on a favored street at a reasonable speed under 
such circumstances that, if the disfavored driver 
proceeds into the intersection it will force the 
favored driver to sharply and suddenly check his 
progress or stop in order to avoid collision. Con-
versely, if the disfavored driver has made his 
stop and deferred to all vehicles that would be 
required to go into a sharp or sudden braking to 
avoid collision, the cars far enough away have 
a clear margin to observe and make a smooth and 
safe stop are not an 'immediate hazard' and are 
required to yield to the driver already at the 
intersection. 
"An analysis of the time, speed, and distance 
factors shows plainly that the plaintiff had more 
than ample time to 01bserve the defendant and 
avoid collision with him. After defendant had 
waited at the entrance to the intersection and al-
lowed others cars to go by, and cars in the outside 
and center lanes had stopped and deferred to 
him, he traveled 38 feet, reaching the speed of 5 
to 10 m.p.h. Computing his average speed be-
tween zero at stop to his maximum acceleration 
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of 10 m.p.h. equals 5 m.p.h.; at which he would 
' . travel about 7¥2 feet per second, amountmg to 
just about 5 seconds elapsed time in the intersec-
tion. During that time the plaintiff, even at the 
minimum speed of 15 m.p.h or 22.5 feet per second, 
would have traveled 112.5 feeet. (He was actually 
traveling a good deal faster because his own 
statement says he was decelerating.) At the speed 
of 15 m.p.h., in his reaction time of three-fourths 
second, he would travel 16lj2 feet and require 18 
feet for stopping with only passable brakes. This 
makes a total of stopping distance of 34.5 feet, 
leaving a margin of 78 feet. For any increase 
in plaintiff's speed, his distance away and his 
opportunity to stop increase proportionately. 
"The plaintiff advances the excuse that the 
two cars stopped in the lanes to his right ob-
scured his view of the defendant. The fact is that 
these cars are each about six feet wide. They 
thus occupied only two such spots in a total of 
33 feet. While it was necessary for plaintiff to be 
watching his own lane ahead, his vision was not 
like looking through a pipe or a tunnel. His angle 
of vision would take in the moving objects in the 
adjacent lanes, particularly a moving object such 
as defendant's car, had he been looking." 
In Hickok vs. Skinner (1948), 113 Utah 1, 190 P. 2d 514, 
where the plaintiff was traveling north on West Temple 
in Salt Lake City, at the interesection of 21st South and 
the, defendant was going west on 21st South, and ,,-here 
the plaintiff admitted he saw the defendant's vehicle 400 
or 500 feet east at the time he left the stop sign to cross 
21st South, and proceeded without looking to the east 
again, and where 21st South was 63 feet wide, and the 
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block along ~1st South along which the defendant was 
traveling was 660 feet long, and the point of itnpact was 
18 feet ~outh of the north rurb of ~1st South and 9 feet 
west of the east curb of \Vest Temple and 65 feet north 
from the stop sign facing 21st South by which the 
plaintiff entered the intersection, and where the police 
officer testified the defendant was going -!5 m.p.h. in 
a 35 m.p.h. zone, and where there were no s:kid marks, the 
court said if the distance were 400 feet, the defendant 
had to travel, going at a speed of -l-5 m.p.h., six seconds 
to reach the point of collision, and if it were 500 feet 
a way, it would have taken 7lj2 seconds for the de-
fendant's car to reach the point of i1npact from the 
time the plaintiff's car left the stop sign, and it can-
not be said that the defendant's car could have been 
approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate 
hazard. Therefore, the defendant was required to yield 
the right-of-way to the plaintiff. 
Obviously, H·ickok t~s. Skinucr, supra, is authority 
to the effect that if a car on the arterial is between six 
or seven and one-half seconds away from the point of 
impact at the time the other vehicle leaves the stop sign, 
it is not so close as to constitute an immediate hazard. 
And Richards ~·s. Anderson, supra, is authority that if 
a vehicle on the arterial is five seconds away from the 
point of impact at the time the vehicle leaves the stop 
sign, the vehicle on the arterial is not so close as 
to constitute an immediate hazard. In reviewing a re-
quest for failure to give a requested instruction, it is 
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the duty of the court to view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the party offering the requested in-
struction. Wolfsmith vs. Marsh (1959), 5- Cal. Repts. 2d 
832, 337 p. 2d 70. 
In Richards vs. Anderson, supra, in defining an 
immediate hazard this court adopted the rule of Fusco 
vs. Dauphin (1950), S Terr. 140, 47 Del. 140, SS Atl. 2d 
813, where this court apparently recognized that a better 
definition of "immediate hazard" was required. In Fusco 
vs. Dauphin we have specific and accurate definition 
of "immediate hazard." 
If the Supreme Court used the yardstick set forth 
in Fusco vs. D,auphin supra, to measure immediate 
hazard, why shouldn't the jury in this case have been 
permitted to use the same yardstick in measuring 
"immediate hazard"~ I submit that the jury should have 
been entitled to use the same yardstick as a guide to 
what was an inunedia te hazard, and yet when the jury 
was not given a definition of "immediate hazard" it was 
left to guess as to what was and was not an "immediate 
hazard" and since the accident occurred immediately fol-
lowing the entry they assumed erroneously there was 
"immediate hazard" when in fact there was not. 
Sgt. Pitcher, in calculating the time from the stop 
sign to the point where Mr. Hertig began his left turn, 
used the same method as this court in Richards vs. 
Anderson, supra. He found that starting from the zero 
speed and reaching a maximum of 20 m.p.h. the most un-
favorable speed to Mr. Hertig, the .average speed would 
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havt> been 10 tniles per hour, or that the average speed 
per :·wcond of .Mr. llet·tig'~ vehicle would have been 1-!.7 
feet pE'r second or that 81;2 seconds were required to 
travel the 125 feet from the stop sign to where the turn 
began as shown on Exhibit 9-D. Mr. Muhlbach admitted 
that he was going 40 miles per hour as he approached 
the intersection (R. 148). He also stated that he had 
better than average reactions (R. 165). Therefore, Sgt. 
Pitcher stated that assuming Mr. Muhlbach was going 
40 miles per hour on the Cottonwood Diagonal, that the 
roadway was dry, and that there were no loose materials 
on it and the the drag-factor wa~ .S-!, from his studies 
and tests he had found a truck could stop in 63¥2 feet 
of braking and 4-1.1 feet of reaction time during a4 of 
a second reaction time and that the total stopping dis-
tance was 107 feet. Sgt. Pitcher also said that a truck 
going ..J.O miles per hour would be going 58.8 feet per 
second and that in 8¥2 seconds the truck would have 
been 499.8 feet from the place where the turn was 
started by Mr. Hertig at the time .Mr. Hertig left 
the stop sign (R. 245). Subtracting the stopping dis-
tance of 107 feet or the total distance the truck was 
from where Mr. Hertig turned or fram the 499.8 feet, 
Sgt. Pitcher found that there was a difference of 
392 feet or that there was 1nargin of safety in stopping 
on the part of l\Ir. Muhlbach, if he had been loaking, of 
392 feet. In Richards vs. Anderson, supra, the plaintiff 
was found contributorily negligent as a matter of law 
in not stopping in a margin of safety of 78 feet. If you 
divide 78 feet into 392 feet, you will find it will go 5 
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times with a slight remainder and it would appear that 
Mr. Muhlbach was five times as negligent as Mr. Rich-
ards who was found to be contributorily negligent as a 
matter of law in Richards vs. Anderson, supr,a. Section 
41-6-144 Utah Code Annotated as amended 1961, declares 
a minimum standard for braking efficency. Using this 
factor Sgt. Pitcher computed Mr. Muhlbaeh's required 
stopping distance on the theory that he had only mini-
Inurn standard brakes, and not good brakes, and found 
that even with a minimum of 40 miles per hour using% 
of a second for reaction time that he could have braked 
to a complete stop in 166.7 feet. Subtracting this dis-
ance from 499.8 feet gave Mr. Muhlbach a margin of 
safety in stopping of 333.1 feet at 1\fr. Muhlbaeh's most 
favorable speed of 40 miles per hour. 
It is submitted that if Mr. Muhlbach had been keep-
ing a lookout and had seen what was plain to be seen, 
he could have safely slowed or stopped and that Mr. 
Hertig's vehicle was not an "immediate hazard" at 
the time Mr. Muhlbach was approaching the intersection. 
Further, it is submitted that in actuality, Mr. Muhlbach 
did not have to stop his truck, but n1erely had to slow 
it to a speed of 15 miles per hour, that in fact he had 
a margin of safety in avoiding an upset in his truck of 
much greater than 333 feet. Since 1\tfr. Hertig had turned 
and was proceeding down the diagonal in the same direc-
tion that Mr. Muhlhach was going at a speed of at least 
15 miles per hour at the time of the turn, to avoid danger 
the truck needed to be slowed only to 15 miles per hour 
to avoid danger. If Mr. Muhlbach's truck was an imme-
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diate hazard at the time :\1 r. Hertig l<>ft the ~top sign to 
go to the intPr~P<'tion, it is submitted all driver~ entPr-
ing intPr~Pctions from stop signs do so at their peril and 
that the driver on the arterial has no duty to keep a 
lookout or see what is plain to be seen at an unobstructed 
int<·r~Petion and that thr driver on the arterial in fact 
has an absolute right of way. 
POINT III. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO IN-
STRUCT THE JURY THAT EACH DRIVER HAD A DUTY TO 
KEEP A LOOKOUT AND THAT IT WAS NEGLIGENCE TO 
FAIL TO SEE WHAT WAS PLAIN TO BE SEEN. 
In requested Instruction N" o. 16 Mr. Hertig requested 
the court ·as follows: (R. 68) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 16 
"You are instructed that the driver on an 
arterial highway has the duty to remain reason-
ably alert to the possibility that a driver entering 
the ·arterial highway at an intersection may be-
lieve that he can enter in safety. 
"The duty to keep a proper lookout applies to 
each driver, and neither driver can excuse his 
failure to observe the other driver because that 
other driver failed to observe him. 
"Failure to see what is plain to be seen is 
'negligence'." 
Requested Instruction No. 14 which was refused (R. 
66) is as follows: 
INSTRFCTIOK NO. 14 
"Where the driver of a truck has ample time 
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to observe a motorist entering the through high-
way and fails to do so in time to avoid an acci-
dent, the driver of the truck is guilty of contribu-
tory negligence." 
In this case Mr. Muhlbach admitted to Officer Iba 
and did not deny his statement in court that he did not 
see the danger of the vehicle ahead until he was 30 feet 
from Mr. Hertig's automobile (R. 181). At the time he 
made his observation J\~Ir. Muhlbach said he was going 
35 or 40 miles per hour. Sgt. Pitcher's testimony shows 
that in 30 feet at 40 miles per hour ~ir. ~Iuhlbach could 
not stop. The pictorial Exhibits 2-D, 4-D and 6-D and all 
of the testimony showed the intersection was unob-
structed. Visibility was good according to Mr. Muhlbach 
and it is apparent that if he had been observing Mr. Her-
tig's vehicle he would have had an ample margin of 
safety in which to slow or stop his truck. It seems rea-
sonable that when requested Instructions 14 and 16, and 
they were not given, that the jurors assun1ed that the 
driver on the arterial had no duty to see what \Vas plain 
to be seen or to keep a lookout and that the jury, in view 
of the emergency doctrine instruction given, assumed 
that Mr. Hertig entered the intersection at his peril. 
The requested instructions were based on the prin-
eiples set forth in Dalley vs . .i.ll id-lV estern Dairy Prod-
ucts Company (1932), 80 Utah 331, 15 P. 2d 309. In 
Dalley vs. Mid-Western Dairy Products Company, the 
court said: 
"In this jurisdiction the doctrine is estab-
lished that it is negligence as a matter of law 
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for a person to drive an automobile upon a 
traveled public highway, used by vehicles and 
pedestrians, at such .a rate of speed that said 
automobile can not be stopped within the distance 
at which the operator of said car is able to see 
objects upon the highway in front of him." 
The evidence is clear that Mr. M uhlb.ach was nearly 
in the intersection before he took evasive action, and in 
fact he said he did not see the danger of Mr. Hertig's 
automobile until he was 30 feet from it. 
From the instructions given it appears the jury 
did not believe Mr. Muhlbach was required to slow to 
stop his vehicle within the distance he could see objects 
in the intersection, and in fact it seems that the jury 
thought he was excused from looking until he was 30 feet 
away from Mr. Hertig. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DIRECT A VER-
DICT FOR THE DEFENDANT BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE 
SHOWED AS A MATTER OF LAW THE PLAINTIFF WAS 
CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT IN FAILING TO KEEP 
THE RIGHT OF WAY AND IN FAILING TO KEEP A 
PROPER LOOKOUT. 
In Johnson vs. Syme (1957), 6 Utah 2d 319, 313 P. 
2d 468, where the plaintiff was traveling north in the 
inside lane on U.S. 91, .a four-lane highway, at a speed 
of 50 miles per hour, at 11 :00 p.m. and was acquainted 
with the area, and where, as she approached the inter-
section, the plaintiff had an unobstructed view to the 
east, and where the defendant's vehicle was traveling 
west at a speed of 40 miles per hour and did not slow 
down for the stop sign facing east at the South Draper 
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road, and where the plaintiff failed to see the decedent's 
vehicle until it was directly in front of her at a distance 
of 20 or 30 feet, a summary judgment in favor of the 
defend~nt against the plaintiff on the arterial was af-
firmed, our court saying that the plaintiff either failed 
to look or failed to look and see the obvious, and as such, 
was contributorly negligent. 
In Conklin vs. Walsh (1948), 113 Utah 276, 193 P. 
2d 437, our court said that a driver traveling on the 
arterial had a duty to remain reasonably alert to the 
possibility that the disfavored driver may believe he 
can cross safely, and if the favored driver entering an 
arterial intersection does not look, he is negligent as a 
matter of law. 
In Martin v.s. Ehlers (1962), 13 litah 2d 236, 271 P. 
2d 851, in a case involving an intersection collision in 
Salt Lake City, where the plaintiff failed to hear a 
plainly audible siren, according to the testimony of other 
witnesses, and where he also failed to see the lights on 
the police vehicle, and where the plaintiff did not reduce 
his speed as he approached the intersection, and neither 
driver saw the other except momentarily before coUision, 
this court held the plaintiff contributorily negligent as 
a matter of law, saying when he does not hear what is 
plainly audible to others, he is not immune ~rom his 
actions simply because he asserts that he did not hear 
anything as audible as a police siren, and if he fails to 
hear the siren or see what was plain to be seen, he is 
contributorily negligent. 
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In Bullock l's. Lllke (1940), 98 l~tah 501, 98 P. :2d 
::.->11, this court said that where there was unob~trueted 
1nh·r~Pdion and where a motorcyclist did not observe for 
a distance of 800 to 1200 feet, he is negligent as a matter 
of law for failing to look and realize that the driver 
on the left was not going to yield the right-of-way. 
In lllorris v:;. Chri:;fensell (1960), 11 Ctah :2d 1-ll, 
356 P. 2d 3-t, this court said it was the duty of a driver 
to observe and to see what there is to see so as to e·xer-
eise ordinary precaution for his own safety. This duty 
extends to the favored driver with the right-of-way, but 
he who has the right-of-way need not anticipate negli-
gence on the part of another driver. 
In Bates vs. Burns (1955 ), 3 Utah 2d 180, 281 P. 2d 
290, where the evidence showed the plaintiff stopped at 
a stop sign 125 feet south of the point of impact and 
then proceeded northward into the intersection and 
thereafter collided with a west bound vehicle on Highway 
91 at the intersection of Highway 114 in Pleasant Grove, 
Utah and where the evidence showed the plaintiff pro-
ceeded at a speed of 5 to 6 1niles per hour from the stop 
sign to the center of the highway, and where, in fact the 
plaintiff not only entered the intersection first but nearly 
had passed over it before the defendant entered, the court 
said the plaintiff was a disfavored driver until he had 
entered the intersection at a time when no car on the 
through highway had entered the intersection or was so 
close as to constitute an immediate hazard, but having 
entered as authorized, he became the favored driver, and 
all other vehicles approaching the intersection on said 
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through highway were obliged to yield the right of way 
to him. 
Section 41-6-74 as amended in 1961 is as follows: 
"VEHICLE ENTERING A THROUGH 
HIGHWAY. The driver of a vehicle shall stop 
as required by this act at the entrance to a 
through highway and shall yield the right of way 
to other vehicles which have entered the inter-
section from said through highway or which are 
approaching so closely on said through highway 
as to constitute an immediate hazard, but said 
driver having so yielded may proceed and the 
drivers of all other vehicles approaching the in-
tersection on said through highway shall yield 
the right of way to the vehicle so proceeding into 
or across the through highway. 
"(b) The driver of a vehicle shall likewise 
stop in obedience to a stop sign as required herein 
at an intersection where a stop sign is erected 
at one or more entrances thereto although not a 
part of a through highway and shall proceed cau-
tiously, yielding right of way to vehicles not so 
obliged to stop which are within the intersection 
or approaching so closely as to constitute an 
immediate hazard, but may then proceed." 
The 1961 amendment substituted the words "yield 
right of way" for the word "yielding" in Sub Section (b), 
a~d except for this change there has been no modifica-
tion~ in. Sections 41-6-74 since Bates us. B·urns, supra, 
was decided. In 1961 Section ±1-6-7 ±.10 was added, but 
the rules set forth in that statute seemed to have no 
application, as in this case there was no collision between 
the vehicles involved, and further it would appear Sub-
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~t'd ion (b) of ~P<·tion -ll-G-7 -l.lO has no application as 
tiH' evidence in thi:-: case shows that there is a n1argin 
or ~arcty in stopping of over 333 feet in which ~lr. i\l"uhl-
bach could have :-:toppPd or slowed his truC'k and as ~urh, 
unless the driver entering from the stop sign enters an 
intPrsection entirPl~· at his peril, under section 41-fi-
i 4.10, Mr. Hertig had the right of way as did l\Ir. Bates 
in Bates cs. BHrns, supra. 
In Ben .... ·on cs. D.&R.G.W. Railroad Company (1955), 
4 Utah 2d 39, 296 P. 2d 790, a case where an action 
wa~ brought by a motorist in a train-auto collision 
which occurred in X ove1nber 1948 during the night in 
a bad snow stonn at a railroad crossing at 2nd ~outh 
and 6th West in Salt LakE' Cit~·, Utah, where the plain-
tiff testified he was going west at 15 to 20 miles per 
hour, and that his visibility was 25 to 30 feet, and 
that the train 'vas going south at 5 to 6 miles per 
hour and where the engine was struck on the left cen-
ter by the plaintiff's vehicle and where at 15 miles 
per hour the plaintiff would have traveled 16¥2 feet 
during 3A, second reaction time, and 18 feet after 
brakes were applied, and thus a total stopping distance 
of 341/2 feet would have been required, the plaintiff was 
held contributorily negligent as a matter of law in driv-
ing at a speed that he could not stop within the distance 
he could see objects on the highway. 
In Hirschbach cs. Dubuque Packing Company 
(1957), 7 Utah 2d 7, 316 P. 2d 319, where a collision oc-
cured four miles west of Knolls, Utah on Highway 40 
on a straight and level stretch and where just prior to 
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the collision the plaintiff driver was traveling west ~ 
miles per hour with good visibility and where his hea 
lights would disclose vehicles at a distance of 350 fee 
and where his brakes were working properly and whei 
he observed defendant's vehicle in sufficient time to hav 
stopped but did not do so because he was under the in 
pression it was moving in the same direction as he wa 
traveling, and that after he discovered it was stopped i 
was too late to stop, this court followed Dalley vs. Mia 
Western Da.iry Products Company, supra, and, affirme' 
a summary judgment granted by the trial court in favo 
of the defendant. 
In Shiba vs. Weis.s (1958) 3 Utah 2d 256, 282 P. 2( 
341, the court found as a matter of law the driver of th~ 
plaintiff's vehicle was negligent in being able to sto] 
within the range of his vision where the accident hap 
pened on a stretch of Highway 40 a few miles west o: 
Strawberry Reservoir and where there was no- evidenc( 
of any obstruction to the view of the driver, where th( 
facts were very similar to Dalley vs. Mid-Western Dair~ 
Products Compan.y, supra. 
In summary it is submitted Mr. Muhlbach havin~ 
admitted to Mr. Iba (R. 181) that he did not observ( 
the danger of this thing until he was 30 feet from Mr 
Hertig's automobile, that he is negligent as a matter o: 
law in not keeping a proper lookout. Further as the evi 
dence shows Mr. Muhlbach's vehicle was 499.8 feet at hi1 
most favorable speed from the place where Mr. Herti~ 
started his left turn to go northwest on the diagonal a 
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tlw time Mr. Hertig left tiH· stop sign. ~~ r. ~~ uhlbach wa:-: 
negligent ·as a matter of law in failing to yield the right 
of way. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment in the lower court 1n favor of the 
plaintiff should be vacated and the lower court should 
be directed to enter a judgment of "No Cause of Action" 
in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff 
N.O.Y., or if this court does not direct the lower court 
to enter a judgment in favor of the defendant then the 
lower court should be instructed to grant the defendant 
a new trial on proper instructions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAYl\10ND l\1. BERRY, 
203 Executive Building 
455 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendant, Appellant 
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